From an outsider’s perspective, China’s 2025 stimulus seems bold. We frequently observe infrastructure investments, credit infusions, and increased exports support, and tax breaks. However, what’s missing beneath the surface is structural rebalancing. It is a shift toward stronger domestic demand, consumption, and reduced reliance on exports. This is exactly the sort of stimulus that Edouard Prisse warns about in We Were Funding China’s Growth That Must Stop!, that sustains dependency rather than fixing it.
In 2025, China’s exports have shown resilience. The first seven months saw export growth of 6.1 percent year-on-year, outpacing even GDP growth in some months. (Bruegel analysis) Domestic demand remains weak, and many industries operate with overcapacity. Producer prices and export prices have trended downward, suggesting deflationary pressures. (Bruegel)
The stimulus packages aim to bridge the gap: loosened credit, support to local governments, subsidies, and tax cuts. But they do little to change the economic model. China still runs a dual circulation strategy, where “external circulation”—exports—remains central. Without deeper reforms, such as liberalizing financial markets, reducing reliance on state-owned enterprises, and boosting household incomes, that dependency stays intact.
From the U.S. perspective, this means continued exposure to Chinese goods. American consumers and firms still depend on Chinese-manufactured goods, components, and rare earth supplies. A realignment of dependence needs a change on both sides. If China exports outward while the U.S. fails to reduce reliance, the imbalance persists.
One danger is that such stimulus inflates the export sector further, making the global trade deficit worse. If China is propped up artificially, it can push more goods into foreign markets at lower costs, undermining industries abroad. Economies that compete in manufacturing or electronics could suffer in the short and medium term.
Another risk is that the stimulus delays need correction. If firms know they will get subsidies, they may overextend, invest wastefully, or avoid restructuring. The legacy of such patterns is harder to correct later.
Some forecasts suggest China’s growth will moderate. The World Bank projects growth moderating from 5.0 percent in 2024 to 4.5 percent in 2025 and 4.0 percent in 2026. (World Bank) That slowdown could intensify the tension between unsustainable stimulus and needed reform.
For those watching trade and geopolitics, this dynamic matters. The U.S. may find its efforts to pressure China blocked by Beijing’s ability to use stimulus as a buffer. And unless the U.S. changes how it trades, how it sets rules, supply chains, and industrial policy, America remains vulnerable to China’s growth and economic manipulation.
Prisse’s book is a blueprint for what real change should look like. He argues that just lowering tariffs or applying soft pressure is not enough. We need a significant shift in trade structure, from free trade as we know it toward mechanisms that prevent one side from carrying the other.
Reading We Were Funding China’s Growth That Must Stop! gives you a clear view of how stimulus without reform is not a fix but a trap. If we want to act now, we must see that stimulus without structural change simply perpetuates the cycle we must break.
Therefore, we must accept some short-term discomfort (fewer cheap goods) in exchange for preserving our democratic future. That’s the trade-off and the price of sovereignty we all need to secure our future.
For more information and insight, please read We Were Funding China’s Growth That Must Stop!
Order your copy from Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/1967963053.